Bonaparte in Italy III — ON PREORDER for 2027!

The War of the First Coalition: April 1796 – Jan 1797 and May – June 1800

Game System: Campaigns of Napoleon, Series 1X
Scale: 2 miles per hex / 2 days per turn / 1,000-man SPs
Playing Time: 3 hours up to 36 hours for the whole campaign

Rules of Play: 32 pages (Napoleon at Bay 1x System)
Study Folder: 24 pages– Scenario Information, Campaign Analysis (G. Fiebeger)
Scenarios: Eight (Montenotte, Lodi, Borghetto, Castiglione, Bassano, Arcola, Rivoli, Marengo.
Map: Three 22 x 34" sections
Counters: 560 upgraded to our current standards, with many new units in neither previous edition.

2 Leader Displays with 8 Scenario Set-Ups
Game Design: Kevin Zucker

In the Winter of 1796, Napoleon Bonaparte was commander of the Reserve Army, a politically visible and published critic on the conduct of the ongoing war against the First Coalition. Though he had no apparent qualifications, his close proximity to the Directory and the influence of his freshly-made bride earned him the command of the quiescent Army of Italy, his first field command, at the age of 26. At once he turned his deep theoretical understanding, in a lightning campaign, against the tottering Sardinian Kingdom and its ally, Austria. By the end of April, he had gained for his army a corner of the fertile Po Valley. From there, in a series of six further operations over the next ten months, the French Army conquered and successfully defended the remainder of the Valley and the key to an advance into Austria, the fortress of Mantua.

PUBLICATION: February 2027

BOX ART IS PRELIMINARY ONLY (Based on 2nd Edition)

Corps and Army-Level Leaders deploy on-map, while Division and Brigade-level combat units track their strength on off-map Organization Displays. The Game Map shows northern Italy, stretching across the "neck" of the peninsula from the Ligurian Sea nearly to the Adriatic (Venice is about ten hexes off the Eastern edge). Dominating the map are is the Po Valley, bounded by the Alps to the north and the Apennines to the south.

OSG is offering a completely new edition of the game, with new maps rendered in Charles Kibler's naturalistic style, updated to use the latest Campaigns System rules. Scheduled for publication in February 2027 concurrent with the TLNB Marengo game. The publication of Marengo will be moved forward so we will gain double-duty from the research! 

Recent research has already brought out much new information, enhancing our understanding of the campaign. This new information, clarified by several visits to the battlefields, is the reason for the new edition.

"Bonaparte in Italy is Operational Studies Group’s definitive treatment of Napoleon’s two Italian campaigns at the operational level. Maneuver is the heart of this game system, focusing on the essence of operational warfare: getting at the enemy on ground of your own choosing.

The focus of Bonaparte in Italy is on the importance of terrain in supporting the operations of an army. Geography determined the tenor of the Italian campaigns. The map depicts the fertile Po Valley cut by rivers flowing in from the surrounding Alps and Apennines. Without substantial external logistical support, an army could quickly have starved in the wilder areas of northern Italy while the Po Valley offered abundant forage and plunder.

The first campaign began with the French army slowly wasting away, pressed along the coast—the only fertile area of the Republic of Genoa. The French had to strike or starve, and they did—driving the Austrians away to the north.

Bonaparte in Italy successfully models the vital role played by terrain. The main terrain types run from the fertile bottomland through the progressively more forbidding flatlands, hills, swamps and mountain hexes. An army either consumes its own supplies (as the Austrians generally do), or it lives off the land. Poor terrain provides little in the way of forage. Units potentially lose strength through attrition. An army must eat whether it moves or not, so you will seldom find the French camped out in the mountains. Straggling and desertion rates were greater drains on manpower than battlefield losses.

The French depended on action and rapid maneuver more than set-piece engagements. In operation the game resembles a football game: large field, few active players, many breaks in the action."
—Edward A. Coe in Fire & Movement Magazine issue 34, May 1983