The Thorn in the Eye: History of the Mantua Siege
Excerpt from “The 1799 Campaign in Italy, Vol. 4
The battle of Novi and the End of the Italian Campaign
By Enrico Acerbi
View of the large entrenched camp of Fortress Mantua
The Siege begins – April / June 1799
Mantova (Mantua) Garrison until 5 Messidor an VII (23 june 1799)
Infantry during the Verona battles - 2415
Guns - 657
Gunboats -15
Total général April-June 1799 - 11812
Garrison Cmdr - General de division François-Philippe de Latour-Foissac [i]
Mantua (Ital. Mantova), a former fortified city of Lombardy, Italy, today capital of the province of Mantua, 35 km. S.S.W. of Verona. It is situated 88 ft. above the level of the Adriatic and was actually on an almost insular site in the midst of the swampy lagoons of the Mincio river. As the belt of marshy ground along the south side can be sunk under water at pleasure, the site of the city proper, exclusive of the considerable suburbs of Borgo di Fortezza (Citadel) to the north and Borgo di San Giorgio to the east, may still be said to consist, as it formerly did more distinctly, of two islands separated by a narrow channel and united by a number of bridges. On the west side the Mincio widens to form a soort of lake, called Lago Superiore, on the east side Lago Inferiore - the boundary between the two being marked by the Argine del Mulino, a long mole stretching northward from the northwest angle of the city to its Citadel.
In that years, it had a census of 2650 houses, 19 churches and 25.000 inhabitants. The city was then still encircled with its high medieval walls of stones and bulwarks. Since 1500, they had also constructed bastions, but the long period of peace, which the country has known for fifty years, made that they neglected their maintenance, so that these works were in very poor state. The north and the east of the city faced the lake. On the north riverside of this lake was the Citadel, linked up with the city by a lifting of earth (Ponte Molina), which mantained the level of the lake water. Another lifting (San Giorgio) linked up the city with the eastern bank of the lake. Mincio continued its course then until Pô, joined at Sacchetta. A part of the lake waters filled the trenches of bulwarks. In fact, a broad part of city surroundings were made of marshes, making the approach of siege-equipments particularly difficult without speaking about health problems linked to this environment (malaria).
The Mantua urban area was malaria plagued from 1190 when a complex artificial lakes system was created for defense purposes. This major ecological transformation set up the habitat for the anopheles mosquitoes, vector of the disease.[i]
From Kriegsarchiv Wien
Marmont: " Mantoue, endowed with a good surrounding wall, is besides covered by two lakes, the one superior, the other inferior: ahead of the first is the citadel, giving a bridgehead of a large development; ahead of the second, the suburb Saint-George, not so strengthened, and who fell between our hands (in 1796 n.d.t.). Of the compared quoting, the lake almost had dried up, and was made up of a current of water forming a big island with the trenches of the place: a party was occupied by the fort said T-Work, intended to cover a long curtain of the place thrown only by some towers and covered by a trench full of water. T-Work was on earth and without surface, but rough and wood-poles filled. "
As a fortress Mantua was long one of the most formidable in Europe, a force of thirty to forty thousand men finding accommodation within its walls; but it had two serious. defects - the marshy climate told heavily on the health of the garrison, and effective sorties were almost impossible. Otherwise, different sources judged the city as not so strong:
“Mantua, situated in the middle of a lake formed by the Mincio river in the course of its passage from the Alps to the Po, depends entirely for its security upon its outer works, and the command of the waters which surround its walls. Two chaussées go across its whole extent on bridges of stone; the first leads to the citadel, the second to the faubourg San Giorgio (St. George).
Connected with the citadel are the external works and entrenched camp, which surround the lake, and prevent all accesses to its margin. These works, with the exception of the citadel, are not of any considerable strength; the real defence of Mantua consists in the command which the garrison has of the waters in the lake, which is formed by three locks. That of the citadel enables them at pleasure to augment the upper lake; that of Pradella gives them the command of the entrance of its waters into the Pajolo; while that of the port Cerese puts it in their power to dam up the canal of Pajolo, and let it flow into inundations to obstruct the approach of the place. But, on the other hand, the besiegers have the means of augmenting or diminishing the supply of water to the lake itself, by draining off the river which feeds it above the town; and the dykes which lead to Pradella are of such breadth as to permit trenches to be cut and approaches made along it. Upon the whole, an exaggerated idea had been formed both of the value and strength of Mantua, by the importance which it had assumed in the campaign of 1796, and the result of the present siege revealed the secret of its real weakness.”
MANTUA GARRISON - 29 germinal an VII - 18 april 1799
Garrison Cmdr - General de division François-Philippe de Latour-Foissac
Chief of Staff Adjudant-général Jean Baptiste Paul Gastine [i]
Adjoint chef-de-brigade Marie Louis de Varennes (93e demi-brigade de ligne) [ii]
2nd Chef of the 2nd Polish Legion - Chef-de-brigade Ludwik Dembowski (assigned to Migliaretto defences) [i]
On 28 floreal an VII (17 May 1799) général de brigade Dembowski became Staff Adjudant-général and Amilcar Kosinski Chef of the 2e Polish Legion for Dembowski troubles with his officers.
PLACE of MANTUA | 7681 |
Engineer commander chef-de-brigade Maubert
Engineer Chef-de-bataillon Perigord
French Artillery - cdr. Chef-de-brigade Borthon
Marine cdr. Lieutenant Pagés | 15 gunboats |
29th Light Infantry demi brigade | 832 |
31st Line infantry demi brigade – chef de brigade Louis Fédon | 2024 |
I Btn. Chef de bataillon Baron | |
III Btn Chef de bataillon Tourel | |
IV btn. Depot 45th Line infantry demi brigade Chef de bataillon Lacroix | 657 |
Polish Artillery
Artillery commander - Chef-de-brigade Wincenty Aksamitowski
Art. 2 nd commander - major - Stanisław Jakubowski - (became St. George Art. Cdr.)
Art. adjudant - major Kajetan Stuart
Art. Quartermaster - major Feliks Mościcki
Polish Art. Btn. - Chef-de-bataillon Józef Aksamitowski
1st Polish Artillery Coy - Capitaine Hipolit Falkowski
2nd Polish Artillery Coy - Capitaine Jakub Redel
Polish Legion artillery coy: 1 sergeant-major, 5 sergeants, 1 caporal furier, 10 caporals, 2 commanders (train), 30 canonniers 1e classe, 47 canonniers 2e classe - total 101 men.
2nd Polish legion– infantry- cdr. général de brigade Jozsef Wielhorski | 1194 |
gen. Wielhorski assigned to Migliaretto defence. | |
III Btn. 2e Legion Polonaise - chef lieut. Col. Antoni “Amilcar” Kosinski [i] | 835 by June |
Mantua Cisalpine Garrison | |
1e demi-brigade légère cisalpine - Cmdr. Chef de Brigade Eugene | 785 |
II/1 Cisalpine Btn chef Cappi, III/l Cisalpine Btn chef Belfort | |
Artillerie Cisalpine | 219 |
Chef-de-bataillon Cerutti and Chef-de-bataillon Verlato | |
Sapeurs Cisalpine - capitaine Joveroni | 240 |
Cisalpine Pontonniers coy - capitaine Chapuis | 60 |
2e demi-brigade piemontaise de ligne chef-de-brigade Fontanieux - | ??? |
1e légion helvétique chef-de-brigade Barthés - | 434 |
Chefs-de-bataillon : chef Mesmer , chef Ott , chef Bucher , chef Abyberg | |
2e légion helvétique chef-de-bataillon Jayet - | 460 |
Chefs-de-bataillon : chef Jounquiére |
Cavalry | |
Carabiniers du Piémont - chef d’escadron Armand Gros | 145 |
7th Dragoons regiment - Chef-d’escadron Delisle | 454 |
Outposts
DEFENCE AVANCÉE DE PRADELLA or Pradella Horn | 535 |
Pradella was the western gate which led to Mantua. It was a so called demi-bastion (Tenaille or Hornwerk in German) having the shape of a letter M with the base in front of Mantua. It had also a ravelin and was surrounded by a water ditch, which could have be filled thanks to the Superior lake. From Pradella there was a good line of sight till the Belfiore heights. The fortification was intended as a protection for the dam, which allowed, if opened, the Superior lake waters to enter in the Pajolo channel, flooding a large area (south, south west of Mantua) so creating a large swamp in front of Migliaretto-Te redoubts. |
Artillerie à pied | 103 |
3rd Polish Artillery Coy - Capitaine Józef Czachowski | |
II btn. 29th Light infantry demi-brigade [ii]- chef-de-bataillon Obert | 392 |
7th Dragoons regiment – ½ Sqn. | 40 |
THE CITADEL | 957 |
The Citadel or Porto Mantovano was the northern defense of Mantua. It was a ring fort (Kronwerk or etoile) or a completely closed geometrical fort, with bastions, ravelins and outer structures. It was linked with the northern part of the city by a long bridge (which was also a dam able to control the waters of the Superior lake in the point where began the middle lake) called Ponte Molini (Mills bridge) because of the old twelve grind mills called the Dodici Apostoli. |
Cdr. Général de brigade Louis-Gabriel Monnet de Lorbeau [i]
The former chef-de-brigade of 31e demi-brigade de ligne
I Btn. 31st Line infantry demi-brigade - Chef–de-bataillon Baron | 884 |
5e régiment d'artillerie à pied - chef-de-bataillon Labadie | 15 |
6e régiment d'artillerie à pied - chef-de-bataillon Mérique | 53 |
FORT SAINT-GEORGE (San Giorgio) | 1372 |
Fort St. George (or better Bourg St.George) was not a tought fortification, rather a protection for the bridge to Mantua. The entrenchments, protected by earth embankments, weren’t so difficult to seize, also if Bonaparte had reinforced them in 1797 after the seize of the fortress. Besides, a dense wood prevented from sighting in time approaching troops and a line of guns batteries, in the village of Zipata, heavily bombarded its side. | |
Cdr. : Général de brigade Jean-Baptiste Meyer de Schauensee [i] | |
Art. cdr. St. George fort - Chef de bataillon Stanisław Jakubowski | |
French Canonniers | 175 |
4th Polish Artillery Coy - Capitaine Jan Mehler | |
26th Light Infantry demi-brigade - Chef-de-brigade Girardelet | 566 |
II Btn 56th Line infantry demi-brigade- chef-de-brigade Morel (Chef-de-bataillon Lelmi) | 774 |
III btn 93rd Line infantry demi-brigade - Chef-de-bataillon Marguel | 487 |
7th Dragoons regiment | 25 |
FRONT MIGLIARETTO –“TE” ISLAND | 1272 |
The Te Palace, ancient residence of the Mantua Dukes, had been transformed in barracks, early, and then in a circular redoubt (Etoile). It was very strong and difficult to seize, because surrounded by water and swamps. Migliaretto, a sandy “island”, which emerged from the swamp, when middle and inferior lakes waters filled the southern area, had a powerful bastion, with its front towards the South, and a second parallel fort in its rear, defending the small city port (Porto Catena). These fortifications covered the city south-eastwards in the direction of the hamlet of Pietole, southwards facing the outpost of Cerese (the very first location the besiegers could seize with a minimal endeavour). | |
Commander: 2nd Polish Legion - général de brigade Jozsef Wielhorski [i] | |
2nd Cdr. - Chef-de bataillon Girard - 2nd Btn. 3lst Line infantry demi-brigade | |
2nd régiment « artillerie à pied » 7th coy | 241 |
II Btn. 3lst Line infantry demi-brigade chef-de-bataillon Girard | 674 |
II Btn. 2e Legion Polonaise Chef-de-brigade Dembowski | 357 |
On 28 floreal an VII (17 May 1799) général de brigade Dembowski became Staff Adjudant-général and Amilcar Kosinski Chef 2e Polish Legion for Dembowski troubles with his officers. |
General Foissac-Latour gave this portrait of the Szef Jozsef Wielhorski, when he was named Commander of the Southern Sector, the more critical zone of the battlefield:
General Wielhorski |
« Le général Wielhorski , officier-général plein a de courage, de connaissances, de présence a d'esprit, méritait d'autant plus la confiance a que je lui marquai, en lui assignant ce poste, a qu'à toutes ces qualités il joignait ce zéle républicain qui lui avait fait abandonner sa fortune en Pologne pour se réunir, dans le midi de l'Europe, aux défenseurs de la liberté, qui a fut toujours chère à sa valeureuse nation. »
This was the order of Foissac-Latour for the nomination :
“Ordre du jour du 29 germinal (April 18).
Brigadier Wielhorski is named commander-in-chief of all the positions of Migliaretto and Te redoubt, also with the outposts situated in front of these entrenchments till the enemy positions, in the ground limited to the left by the lower lake, and to the right by the swamp which leans in the half-bastion aside of the Te-redoubt. He will take this command as soon as his health will allow him; in the meantime, this important command is entrusted to the chief of the 31st line battalion, Girard; from this moment, he will be appointed with the name of commander-in-chief of the Migliaretto frontline.The chief of brigade Balleydier, of the 29th light infantry half-brigade, is named commander of the Pradella front, and of all the outposts situated in front of this work, between the swamps (about which is spoken above), and the superior lake, till the enemy positions. These commanders will lodge in positions, the nearest possible to these point, entrusted to their courage, to their enlightment, to their republican patriotism.
Independently of the common guard duties, previously fixed for these two posts,, there will be, every day, a reserve battalion shared between them, in the proportion of one third for Pradella, and two thirds, of its strength, for Migliaretto.
These reserves will begin their service during the night, and will be withdrawn during the day, after they will have received the permission from the respective commandans. They will be held in their camps, within and next to the gates of Migliaretto and Pradella,ready to go outside in case of night-attack.
Henceforth the total strength of garrison will be shared in three equal parts): one will supply the guards) and the workers teams; the second will always be ready to march in order of battle, and will supply the reserves and detachments, the third will be completely in rest.
The not employed reserve troops will be kept in their barracks; the officers will wear the hausse-col (pass), and will be nearby, ready to reach their troop. The Polish troops, having been integrated in the army under the French police and the people war-commissioners, will be left in Mantua under the control of these same commissioners.
All the present Polish officers “à la suite” or supernumeraries, making their service, will enjoy the rations of their respective ranks; all, without distinction of rank, will have the treatment of the second lieutenants. As a consequence the war-commissioners will count them in their distribution bills and will organize the depots according to this arrangement). I will ask directly the general Wielhorski for the situations. “
Migliaretto artillery positions – (middle June 1799)
“Thé” Island guns | 17 |
Migliaretto bastions 1 and 2- guns | 7 |
Road Lunette guns | 2 |
Entrenched camp guns | 10 |
New lunette guns | 10 |
Pajolo Dike Bty guns | 2 |
AUSTRIAN SIEGE FORCE - April 1799
The siege army Corps (Belagerung Korps) was distributed in three camps, which surrounded almost the totality of the outer Mantua walls. Generals Ott, Lattermann and Zopf commanded at the western gate, Pradella. The Russians, under Bagration, initially deployed separately and watched the northern side, the citadel or the Port fortress. All the inhabitans of the countryside, around Mantua, were forced to help the besiegers. The defense of the city, as told, were managed by the French major general Foissac-Latour, named commander-in-chief of the place, since the 9 Germinal year VII (March 29, 1799). The total strength of Mantua initially consisted in a garrison of about twelve thousand men.
The Malaria (literally Bad Air)
The situation, at the beginning of the siege, became quickly severe. The French, during the 1796 siege, thought Vinegar could be of some help to keep fit their troops!
«Les maladies commencement » wrote adjudant général Franceschi to Berthier « il faudrait faire commencer les distributions de vinaigre aux troupes. Dans un pays malsain cela est indispensable. »
After the first days, the number of the feverish went rapidly growing up: on July 29 (11 thermidor) the French divisions had 200 men sick; six weeks after the hospitals were full.
By the way, general Sahuguet, commander of the eastern sector of Mantua, took care of camping his troops on a plateau, five to six “toises” [i] far from the lake, concluding, with optimism, they was there at the best quarters for their health. Joubert report, instead, had fixed to thirty - forty “toises” the minimum distance useful to avoid the “bad air” (malaria). There wasn’t any conformity, but this is suitable to indicate the efforts which made the French commanders in order to protect the health of their men. During the vendémiaire month of 1796, the diseases increased. « Soyez persuadé, général » wrote Cisalpine brigade general Lahoz to Bonaparte, « que si vous passiez la revue d'une demi-brigade, vous n'y trouveriez au plus que la moitié du monde porté sur les états de votre Etat Major ... »
Belagerungkorps: FML Pál Kray de Krajowa et Topolya
Paul Kray was born on 5th February, 1735 at Käsmark - Hungary (today: Kezmark/Slovakia). Kray studied in Vienna and when 18-year-old enrolled as cadet in the Imperial-Austrian infantry regiment No. 31 „ Samuel Freiherr Haller of Hallerstein “ in 1754 taking part in the seven-year-old war (in 1756-1763). From the rank of grenadier's captain Kray climbed up in 1778 to major in the infantry regiment No. 39 "Preysach" and in 1783 to lieutenant-colonel in the 2nd Székler border infantry regiment. In 1784 Kray stood in Transylvania controlling there the significant agrarian uprising in Walachia. In the Turkish wars he took an active part at Porczeny and the Vulcan Pass. Made major-general in 1790, three years later, he commanded the advance guard of the Allies operating in France. In the celebrated campaign of 1796, on the Rhine and Danube, he did conspicuous service as a corps commander. At Wetalar, he defeated Kléber, and, at Amberg and Würzburg, he was largely responsible for the victory of the Archduke Charles of Austria. In the following year, he was less successful, being twice defeated on the Lahn and the Mainz.
Situation on May 1st 1799Austrian Siege (Belagerung) Korps MantuaFirst units – from april 1799 | 14000 men [ii] |
Feldbrigade Generalmajor Anton Freiherr von Elsnitz | |
Jäger Korps Freiherr Constantin d'Aspre (4 coys) | 485 |
I Btn. 3rd Grenzregiment of Carlstädt Ogulin Cdr. Freiherr Carl von Letzenyi | 950 |
VII Combined Btn Grenzregiment Warasdiner of Varazdin | 553 |
IV Btn Grenzregiment of Banat Wallachisch Illyrische | 418 |
K.k. IR 53 Croatian Rifle Rgt. GM Jovan (Johann) Jellacic Graf de Buzim | 1412 |
Btns I – II - III- Cmdr. Oberst Johann Szenássy |
Feldbrigade Generalmajor Johann Graf von Klenau und Freiherr von Janowitz | |
K.k. 8th Hussar Regiment (later Nauendorff) | 1272 |
(former Rgt Wurmser) (8 sqn.) - Cmdr: Oberst (Colonel) Emanuel Freiherr von Schustekh | |
K.k. 3rd Light Inf. Btn Oberleutnant Carl Freiherr von Am Ende (italian-Venetian Btn) | 692 |
K.k. 4th Light Inf. Btn Major Johann Nepomuk Freiherr von Bach (italian-Venetian Btn) | 794 |
IV Btn 4th Grenzregiment of Carlstädt - Szluin | 1140 |
II Btn Banal Grenzregiment or I Btn - 10th Banal Rgt. of Glina | 1046 |
cmdr. Oberst Daniel (Danilo) von Oreskovic |
Feldbrigade Generalmajor Graf Johann Franz Seraphin von Saint Julien [iii] |
Also at Peschiera | |
K.k. IR 14 Rifle Rgt. Freiherr Wilhelm von Klebek | 1722 |
Btg I , II e III – Cdr. Oberst Freiherr Franz Kottulinsky | |
K.k. IR 48 Rifle Hungarian Rgt. | 1428 |
Former Rgt of Lombardy. later Rgt. Freiherr Philipp von Vukassovic – Cmdr. Oblt Franz De Baut (I-II Btns) |
Feldbrigade Generalmajor Marquis Hannibal Sommariva (Provisional command) | |
K.k. IR 45 Rifle Rgt Freiherr Franz von Lattermann | 1027 |
II - III btns. Cmdr. Obst Carl Rüdt von Collenberg - The I Btn was the Legnago garrison with 517 men | |
K.k. IR 59 Rifle Rgt. FML Alexander von Jordis | 1728 |
Btns I – II - III- Cmdr. Obst Franz Högl von Hockheim |
First Period – The quiet siege
While the besieging army Corps pushed its works ahead with a remarkable vitality, the French general commander-in-chief organized the defences “à la républicaine” periodically gathering a democratic War Council, every ten days, in which every sector commander could report the progress of the defensive tasks. The first, official, War Council was summoned on 6 Floreal (April 25). The Council, led by the general-in chief himself, consisted of ten members: [i]
1st - the general commander-in-chief Foissac-Latour, the president; 2nd - the brigadier Meyer, commanding fort Saint George; 3rd - the brigadier Monnet, commanding the citadel; 4th - the brigadier Wielhorski, commanding Migliaretto; 5th - the chef-de-brigade Balleydier, commander at Pradella; 6th - the adjudant-general Gastine, the chief of staff; 7th - the chef-de-brigade Borthon, commanding the artillery; 8th – chef-de-brigade Maubert, commanding the Engineers; 9th - lieutenant Pagès, commanding the navy; 10th - the police war commissioner Leclèrc, as secretary.
Différens works of the besiegers had been begun to come closer to the fortified place, so, the general-in chief, with a surprising order on 15 Floreal (May 4), announced a general sortie from all the gates of the place. By a general agreement, was decided this sortie had to consist of four main columns, the first going out from the Cérèse door, the second from Saint George, a third from the citadel, and finally the fourth from Pradella.
The day of 19 Floreal (May 8) was indicated for this operation; the Polish legion, which, in this occasion, covered itself with the glory mantle, had the honour to form the first main column, advancing out from Cérèse door, and led by the colonel (szef-brigady) Louis Dembowski. The action, which followed this general sortie, was protracted and powerful; it was fought with determination by both opposite troops. The Polish legion had six men killed, between non-commissioned officers and soldiers; ten officers and fifty nine NCOs-soldiers wounded; nineteen NCOs-soldiers prisoners. General Wielhorski, in his report of 19 floreal, praised the value of the troops under his orders, as well as the detachment of the French 31st demi-brigade.
Chef-de-brigade Dembowski, the first in front of the column got out by Cérèse door, taken by his personal bravery, found himself in the middle of the struggle and stroke some soldiers under his orders with the sabre. This circumstance made the delivery of a censure, which was commenced against him. The legion officers sent this subject of their remonstrance to general Foissac-Latour; but this last one, in order to immediately suppress this germ of insubordination, which could have been devastating for the troops morale, simply recommended to forget the whole matter. The final result of this conciliation was not so rewarding at first, but, at least, the peace recovered. [ii]
Among the various rewards which were awarded to the bravest, the “Ordre du jour” of 23 floreal (May 12, 1799) mentioned the citizen Iakubowski, commanding of the fortress artillery, who deserved great prizes for the way by which had served with his guns, and who obtained, in the name of the French nation, a hundred-franc bonus. As for the second column of Cérèse, led by general Wielhorski, where the 31st line detachment had acquired a striking name, the general-in chief awarded to this column a general bonus of twelve hundred “livres”.
Austrian troops Summer escalation
The garrison originally consisted of nearly eleven thousand men; but this force, barely adequate at first to manage its extensive ramparts, was now considerably weakened by diseases. The peculiar situation of this celebrated fortress rendered it indispensable that, at all hazards, the exterior works should be maintained, and this was no easy matter with an insufficient body of troops. The soldiers were provisioned for a year; but the inhabitants, impoverished by enormous contributions, were in the most miserable condition, and the famine with which they were menaced, joined to the natural unhealthiness of the situation during the autumnal months, soon produced those contagious disorders ever in the rear of protracted war, which, in spite of every precaution, seriously weakened the strength of the garrison. Before the final clash between the Coalized army and Macdonald at the Trebbia river, the Austrian siege Corps was reinforced by utter 10.000 men.
Austrian Siege (Belagerung) Korps Mantua June 4, 1799
Gruppe FML Paul Kray de Krajowa et Topolya | 24318 |
Avantgarde Brigade Generalmajor Johann Graf von Klenau und Freiherr von Janowitz
Jäger Korps Freiherr Constantin d'Aspre (4 coys) | 558 |
K.k. 3rd Light Inf. Btn Oberleutnant Carl Freiherr von Am Ende (italian-Venetian Btn) | 673 |
K.k. 4th Light Inf. Btn Major Johann Nepomuk Freiherr von Bach (italian-Venetian Btn) | 779 |
II btn K.k. IR 18 Rifle Rgt. Graf Patrick Stuart | 901 |
II btn K.k. IR 10 Rifle Rgt. (former Kheul) | 845 |
II Btn Banal Grenzregiment or I Btn - 10th Banal Rgt. of Glina | 1131 |
cmdr. Oberst Daniel (Danilo) von Oreskovic |
Brigade Generalmajor Anton Freiherr von Elsnitz
K.k. IR 48 Rifle Hungarian Rgt. | 1475 |
Former Rgt of Lombardy. later Rgt. Freiherr Philipp von Vukassovic – Cmdr. Oblt Franz De Baut (I-II-III Btns) | |
K.k. IR 59 Rifle Rgt. FML Alexander von Jordis | 1728 |
Btns I – II – III Cmdr. Obst Franz Högl von Hockheim | |
IV Btn 4th Grenzregiment of Carlstädt - Szluin | 1017 |
Brigade Generalmajor Graf Johann Franz Seraphin von Saint Julien-Walsee
III btn K.k. IR 32 Hungarian Rifle Rgt. Graf Samuel Gyulai | 890 |
I Btn. 3rd Grenzregiment of Carlstädt Ogulin Cdr. Freiherr Carl von Letzenyi | 965 |
IV Btn Grenzregiment of Banat Wallachisch Illyrische | 377 |
K.k. IR 45 Rifle Rgt Freiherr Franz von Lattermann | 1007 |
II - III btns. Cmdr. Obst Carl Rüdt von Collenberg - The I Btn was the Legnago garrison with 517 men |
Brigade Generalmajor Nikolaus Joseph Pálffy von Erdöd [iii]
K.k. IR 14 Rifle Rgt. Freiherr Wilhelm von Klebek | 1708 |
Btg I , II e III – Cdr. Oberst Freiherr Franz Kottulinsky | |
K.k. IR 53 Croatian Rifle Rgt. GM Jovan (Johann) Jellacic Graf de Buzim | 1378 |
Btns I – II - III Cmdr. Oberst Johann Szenássy |
Brigade Generalmajor Friedrich Xavier Prince Hohenzollern-Hechingen
K.k. IR 24 Rifle Rgt (former Preiss) | 1389 |
(btns I – II – III) - Cmdr Oberst Carl Philipp von Weidenfeld | |
K.k. IR 43 Rifle Rgt. Graf Anton Thurn-Val Sassina | 1326 |
I-II btns . III Btn at Zara garrison (Dalmatia) - Cmdr. Freiherr Ignaz von Loen | |
K.k. IR 13 Rifle Rgt. Freiherr Franz Wenzel Reisky von Dubnitz | 1160 |
I-II btns. 4th was at Palmanova in Friaul – Cmdr Obst Freiherr Carl von Brigido | |
VII Combined Btn Grenzregiment Warasdiner of Varazdin | 600 |
Cavalry Brigade Oberst Emmanuel Freiherr von Schustekh
Bussy Freiwillige Jägers zu Pferd (Chasseurs a Cheval) | 1364 |
Cmdr. Generalmajor Anton Graf Mignot de Bussy - (8 sqns.) | |
K.k. 12th Cuirassiers Rgt. FML Moritz Graf Kavanagh | 977 |
(6 sqn.) Cmdr. Oberst Heinrich Bersina von Siegenthal | |
K.k. 8th Hussar Regiment (later Nauendorff) | 1170 |
(former Rgt Wurmser) (8 sqn.) - Cmdr: Oberst (Colonel) Emanuel Freiherr von Schustekh |
And, by utter arrangement, on the end of June with other 3000 men …
Austrian Siege (Belagerung) Korps Mantua, July 5th – August 2nd
Gruppe FML Paul Kray de Krajowa et Topolya | 26780 |
With Ott Division | 32100 |
Chief of Staff: Oberst Anton Freiherr von Zach | |
Austrian artillery | 667 |
Commander of Austrian besieging artillery: Oberst Reisner | |
Austrian Sappers | 62 |
Austrian Pioneers | 351 |
Chief engineers of the Korps: Oberstlieutenants Dunno and Orlandini | |
Austrian Miners | 30 |
Russian artillery Coy Durasov | 337 |
Russian Pioneers Coy Nasimov | 193 |
Brigade Generalmajor Christoph Freiherr von Lattermann | |
K.k. IR 43 Rifle Rgt. Graf Anton Thurn-Val Sassina | 1964 |
I-II btns . 1/3 III Btn (2/3 at Milano) - Cmdr. Freiherr Ignaz von Loen | |
K.k. IR 14 Rifle Rgt. Freiherr Wilhelm von Klebek | 1078 |
Btg I , II e III – Cdr. Oberst Freiherr Franz Kottulinsky | |
K.k. IR 10 Rifle Rgt. (former Kheul) | 2530 |
Btns I – II – III Cmdr. Oberst Freiherr Ferdinand Beulwitz (from Venice) |
Division Generalmajor Anton Freiherr von Elsnitz | |
K.k. IR 53 Croatian Rifle Rgt. GM Jovan (Johann) Jellacic Graf de Buzim | 1221 |
Btns I – II Cmdr. Oberst Johann Szenássy | |
K.k. IR 59 Rifle Rgt. FML Alexander von Jordis | 1775 |
Btns I – II – III Cmdr. Obst Franz Högl von Hockheim | |
K.k. IR 48 Rifle Hungarian Rgt. | 1277 |
Former Rgt of Lombardy. later Rgt. Freiherr Philipp von Vukassovic – Cmdr. Oblt Franz De Baut (I-II-III Btns) | |
IV Btn Grenzregiment of Banat Wallachisch Illyrische | 345 |
III Btn 3rd Grenzregiment of Carlstädt Ogulin (former VII Carlstadt Btn.) | 960 |
I Btn. 3rd Grenzregiment of Carlstädt Ogulin Cdr. Freiherr Carl von Letzenyi | 809 |
K.k. 12th Cuirassiers Rgt. FML Moritz Graf Kavanagh | 876 |
(6 sqn.) Cmdr. Oberst Heinrich Bersina von Siegenthal |
Brigade Generalmajor Graf Johann Franz Seraphin von Saint Julien-Wallsee | |
Jäger Korps Freiherr Constantin d'Aspre (4 coys) | 408 |
K.k. hungarian Grenadier Btn Oberleutnant Ferdinand Pers | 199 |
K.k. IR 16 Rifle Rgt. Freiherr Ludwig Terzy | 2700 |
(I-II- 1/3 III btns) Cmdr. Graf Franz Khevenuller-Metsch | |
K.k. IR 4 Rifle Rgt. Hoch-und-Deutschmeister Erzherzog Maximilian von Köln | 2700 |
(I-II-III btns) Cmdr. Oberst Carl von Brixen | |
III btn K.k. IR 32 Hungarian Rifle Rgt. Graf Samuel Gyulai | 686 |
Brigade Generalmajor Graf Ferdinand Johann Morzin
III Btn. K.k. IR 26 Rifle Line Inf. Rgt. Freiherr Wilhelm Schröder von Lilienhoff | 758 |
K.k. IR 13 Rifle Rgt. Freiherr Franz Wenzel Reisky von Dubnitz | 1512 |
I btn from Brescia -II btn – III btn from Ott division – Cmdr Obst Freiherr Carl von Brigido | |
K.k. IR 39 hungarian Rifle Rgt. Graf Thomas (Támas) Nádasdy | 3380 |
(I-II-III btns) – Cmdr. Freiherr Johann Nepomuk Apfaltrern | |
K.k. IR 40 Rifle Rgt. FZM Graf Joseph Mittrowsky | 1548 |
(I-II btns from Ott div. –III btn from Brescia ) Cmdr. Oberst Franz Kreyssern |
Brigade Generalmajor Freiherr Ferdinand von Minkwitz | |
K.k. IR 45 Rifle Rgt Freiherr Franz von Lattermann | 1339 |
II - III btns. Cmdr. Obst Carl Rüdt von Collenberg - The I Btn was the Legnago garrison with 517 men | |
IV Btn 4th Grenzregiment of Carlstädt - Szluin | 1044 |
VI Btn Grenzregiment of Banat Wallachisch Illyrische | 445 |
K.k. 3rd Light Inf. Btn Oberleutnant Carl Freiherr von Am Ende (italian-Venetian Btn) | 650 |
Detached as Garrisons and on river Po (Casalmaggiore bridgehead)
Division Generalmajor Johann Graf von Klenau und Freiherr von Janowitz | |
II btn K.k. IR 18 Rifle Rgt. Graf Patrick Stuart | 758 |
II Btn Banal Grenzregiment or I Btn - 10th Banal Rgt. of Glina | 905 |
cmdr. Oberst Daniel (Danilo) von Oreskovic | |
VII Combined Btn Grenzregiment Warasdiner of Varazdin | 600 |
Bussy Freiwillige Jägers zu Pferd (Chasseurs a Cheval) | 800 |
Inhaber Generalmajor Anton Graf Mignot de Bussy - (8 sqns.) – Cdrs. Oberst Johann Frimont, Major Charles Graf Forceville |
Cavalry Brigade Oberst Emmanuel Freiherr von Schustekh | |
K.k. 8th Hussar Regiment (later Nauendorff) | 1170 |
(former Rgt Wurmser) (8 sqn.) - Cmdr: Oberst (Colonel) Emanuel Freiherr von Schustekh | |
Brigade Generalmajor Nikolaus Joseph Pálffy von Erdöd | |
K.k. 4th Light Inf. Btn Major Johann Nepomuk Freiherr von Bach (italian-Venetian Btn) | 779 |
K.k. IR 24 Rifle Rgt (former Preiss) | rests |
(btns I – II – III) - Cmdr Oberst Carl Philipp von Weidenfeld – 1343 men before Modena |
The besieging army, which, in the meantime was grown, continued to fortificate itself with the highest energy possible, considering the spreading of fevers and malaria. Kray, taking advantage with ability of all the means at his disposal, had caused his flotilla descend by Peschiera and Goito from the lake of Garda, and brought up many gunboats by the inferior part of the Mincio into the lower lake. By means of these vessels, which were armed with guns of the heaviest calibre, he kept up an incessant fire on the dykes, and at the same time established batteries against the curtain between the citadel and fort St George. These were intended merely as feints, to divert the attention of the besiegers from the real point of attack, which was the front of fort Pradella; the front chosen for the operation was Pradella, seeming the less defensible.
On messidor 18 (July 6), the Austro-Russians enginers began to build two redoubts in front of the Pajolo channel, between Cérèse and Pradella. The commander of the Polish artillery, Axamitowski, set up an hard resistance, as a result of the orders he received from the Place artillery commander, Borthon. In the meanwhile the Austrian had concentrated many artillery batteries at “la Mortuana (Montata?)”, near the citadel and at “la Moretta (Mottella?)” in front of St.George. They began to harass the defenders with strong artillery fire, from the new positions. It was the time, for the Austrians, to try an attack against the fortress.
The western Austrian entrenched line was finished and occupied during the July 6 night (it led from Simeone through Casa Rossa, Chiesa nuova, Dosso del Corso, Palazzina till Angioli (Borgo Angeli?) on the superior lake). Two new batteries were placed at Simeone and Casino Sparavieri in order to support the right flank of an attack and to counterbattery the French fire coming from behind the Pajolo dam. The Austrian camp was set between Capilupia and Certosa, while the buildings at Chiesa nuova, Dosso del Corso, Palazzina and Angioli were prepared to be camp hospitals. The artillery workshop was organized at Madonna delle Grazie, a Catholic sanctuary near Curtatone.
On messidor 20 (July 8), the bombardment of the French pieces, mainly those of the Poles against Casa Rossa, forced the enemies to abandon their works; so they were obliged to begin newly the job shifting on the left. So, at the right of Cerese (Austrian right), the Imperials deployed other four batteries, in order to bombard the flank of the French positions of the Torrazzo tower, at Cerese. During the night of July 9-10 the Austrians trenches (Schanzen) were ready and the Austrians batteries began an intense fire against the Torrazzo. That messidor 22 (July 10), there was also a continued bombardment made by the Polish artillery, even during the night, caused a serious stop to the enemies works, which could not anymore have some progress.
General Kray’s “digging” attack
On July 10, general Kray attacked the fortress from its southern flank, and the general Saint-Julien was able to seize the entrenchements of Cérèse, as well as the bridgehead, which covered the dam-lock. The assault began at 3.00 AM in the night with two Austrian battalions in column (one Lattermann’s and one Gyulai). The Torrazzo tower (Cerese) was taken and the French withdrawn, leaving back one gun, one howitzer and 12 Wall guns (Doppelhaken). The Austrians lost 3 soldiers (dead) and 14 wounded.
During the 13/14 night, the Austrian opened the first parallel approach trench, in front of the Te bastions. 1200 soldiers and about 2000 peasants were transferred from Pietole till Angioli to reinforce the left wing. The general Foissac-Latour strongly replied to the attack, but the enemy did never stop bombarding frontally and on the flanks the entrenchments of Te island and Migliaretto. During the same night the Austrians opened a new parallel trench, far about 570 m [iv] from the bastions of Pradella. At 5 o’clock AM, from the fort, came a violent artillery and musket fire, which lasted all the day and also in the following, July 15, with great shouts of “Vive la République”coming from the walls. In the first and in a second parallel trench, in front of Pradella, as near their batteries, the Austrian had massed about 3300 workers (mostly peasants) in order to hasten the digging job. During the July 16 night the parallel trenches were widened to 5,6 m, while the communication ditches reached the width of 4,70 m (15 Schuhen). On messidor 29 (July 17), the activity of the Austrians began to be febrile surprising the defenders. It was for these events that, among differents projects discussed in the war council searching for the most suitable meansto react, it was sent an anonymous letter to general Foissac-Latour, containing some critical observations about the matters detailed in his orders. Instead of being disturbed or disheartened by the fact, the commander-in-chief praised the zeal of the author of the letter in question, and wished to be able to know the unknown person.
On July 18 the French artillery of the Te entrenched camp and of the Alexis bastion (Pradella) continually harassed the workers on duty (in this day the Austrian lost 5 men dead and 19 wounded, while other 4 soldiers died on the following day. By July 19 the work strength into the trenches had reached the 4000 units, while, on July 20, 3750 soldiers and 900 peasants dug out the second parallel trench, on the right wing, in front of the western side of Te palace. However the Austrain “moles” did not show any sign of fatigue during their duties.
From 3 to 6 thermidor (July 21-24), the besiegers systematic attack became more lethal. General Wielhorski was then sick in his bed for a gout’s attack, and was replaced by general Fontanier and chef-de-bataillon. Brigadier Meyer, commander of the defence of Migliaretto and partially of Te, replacing there general Wielhorski, on the other hand, was continually praising and supporting the activity of the commander of the artillery Iakubowski, who was in Saint George's fort, which it was necessary to evacuate, because of the impossibilty to resist more and for a long time. The losses of its garrison were considerable.
Actually, St. George was not more defensible, because having been broken the dam, which linked together the bastions San Nicola to the n. 2 of Migliaretto, the waters passed through with an impressive speed. On the night of the 24th, all the batteries of the besiegers being fully armed, they opened their fire, from above two hundred pieces, with such tremendous effect, that the defences of the fortress speedily gave way before it; in less than two hours the outworks of fort Pradella were destroyed; while the batteries intended to create a diversion against the citadel, soon produced a serious impression.
On July 25, however, the two parallel trenches, on the right and on the left of the Pradella road, were unexpectedly dismantled by heavy artillery fire. The Austrians now changed the terrain in which make pressure against the fortress and chose the road of Cerese, with its left and right banks. An Austrian attack was led by Oberst Ried with the Gyulai battalion and advanced till the Te bastions, being heavily shot by the guns on the walls. The cost was very high, 22 dead and around 60 wounded forced again the Austrian to the withdrawal. By July 26 night, while the Austrian sappers were able to “touch” the outer bastion of Pradella, the French abandoned St. George. The opponents seized the fort with one infantry battalion (Oberst Pálffy) and 5 Reserve guns, directed against the eastern part of Mantua. On July 27 the Austrians opened a third parallel approaching-trench, close to the Alexis and Luterana bastions at Pradella, and began to operate for the definitive breach in the walls. At 10 o’clock of that day, general Kray de Krajova sent the engineer Oberstlieutenant Orlandini into the fortress, for a negotiation mission.
JULY 27, 1799. The end of a siege
MANTUA FORTRESS GARRISON (4.- 27. July 1799)
Staff:
Garrison’s Commander: gen. Philippe François Foissac-Latour | |
fit to fight | 3341 |
Migliaretto garrison | 600 |
Artillery Cdr.: Chef-de-Brigade Borthon
Engineer Cdr. : Chef-de-Brigade Maubert
Cisalpine Chief of Organization: Lodovico Gazzarri
Cdr. Mantua lakes fleet: Capt. Pagés
2nd Polish Legion chef Amilcar Kosinski – fit to fight | 570 |
Garrison’s troops:
26th Light infantry demi-brigade- chef Girardelet | 221 |
29th Light infantry demi-brigade | 325 |
31st Line infantry demi-brigade - chef-de-brigade Louis Fédon – plus the Citadel garrison | 161 |
45th Line infantry demi-brigade - IV Btn. Depot chef Sicard | 370 |
93rd Line infantry demi-brigade - Chef Marguel | 226 |
I Btn. 2nd Polish Legion - chef Mateusz Królikiewicz | 212 |
1st Swiss legion (Helvétique) - chef-de-brigade Barthés | 190 |
2nd Swiss legion (Helvétique) | 156 |
1st Cisalpine Light infantry demi-brigade - chef Eugene | 411 |
III Btn. 2nd Polish Legion - chef major Kasper Wolinski | 94 |
Piedmont Carabiniers Squadron | 145 |
The CITADEL or Cittadella Fortress
Cdr: général de brigade Louis Monnet de Lorbeau
2nd Cdr. : Cdr. de la place chef-de-bataillon Abaffour
I Btn. – 31st Line infantry demi-brigade | 184 |
Gun Detachment 5th artillery Rgt. | 15 |
Gun Detachment 6th artillery Rgt. | 53 |
Defensive fortification Pradella
Western Fortress Door
Commander: Chef-de-Brigade Balleydier
II btn 29th Light infantry demi-brigade chef Obert | 192 |
7th regiment Dragoons Detachment | 40 |
3rd Coy Polish Legion artillery Cpt. Józef Czachowski |
Defensive fortification Migliaretto
and Island of Te
Cdr : général de brigade
Jean Baptiste Rodolphe Meyer de Schauensee
2nd Cmdr. : Chef-de-Btn. Passant
Cdr. : adjudant-général. József Wielhorski
Wielhorski was ill – not Malaria but Gout.
Artillery Cmdr.: Chef-de-Btn. Wincenty Aksamitowski
1st Coy Polish Legion artillery – Cpt. Hipolit Falkowski
2nd Coy Polish Legion artillery – Cpt. Jakub Redel
II Btn - 31e demi-brigade Inf. De Ligne | 370 |
II Btn. 2nd Polish Legion - chef major Leon Mościcki | 264 |
San Giorgio Entrenched Camp
Artillery Cmdr.: Mjr Stanisław Jakubowski
4th Coy Polish Legion artillery – Cpt. Jan Mehler
56th Line infantry demi-brigadechef-de-brigade Morel | 509 |
The Capitulation
Foissac-Latour, wanting to have the most clear reports on the state of the defence, summoned the 9 thermidor (July 27), at ten o'clock in the morning, a general War Council of all superior officers and generals of the garrison, with an invitation, beforehand made by the chief of staff, to each chief, in order to obtain the maximum knowledge of the facts, making personal reconnaissance in the all fronts under attack, before coming to the general session.
The general-in chief was just set to go to Council, when the silence of the enemy batteries and the officer of the place announced him the arrival of the Austrian messenger. This (Oblt. Orlandini. NoT) had come to Mantua by horse, raising the white flag and asking to be received on behalf of the besieger general Kray; he suggested also to cease the fire from the fortress, being the Austrian one already stopped. General Foissac-Latour received this request, and after only an hour later, arrived count Orlandini, imperial engineers lieutenant-colonel: he was escorted by a hussars lieutenant and by an aide-de-camp of general Kray. Orlandini gived then a letter from Kray, dated Castellucchio, on July 26, 1799 (8 thermidor - year VII), in which was an ultimatum and with which Kray supplied the official evidence that the retreat) of both the French armies in Italy, beyond the Appennines, gave Mantua no more hopes to be helped.
Having read the letter, the general-in chief answered to the messenger he did not believe that there were so extreme circumstances, for Mantoue, as told by the Austrian general; besides that, being actually near to enter the war council, he promised to announce there the letter of general Kray, and that we would inform him of the Council’s decision. Lieutenant-colonel Orlandini observed that he was ordered to wait for an answer, and asked the general-in chief to allow his presence up to the end of the council; refusing this, he had orders, by his return, to revive the fire of the artillery.
Foissac-Latour agreed to this reason, all his batteries being ruined. He thus asked the parliamentaries to reach a separate room, where they could rest with officers of his staff, until an answer could have been sent; then he ordered to his Staff to take profit from the situation, to move troops where it would be possible, to do the most urgent repairs, showing everywhere a lot of activity and resolution. The Mantua commander then summoned his war council, which consisted of 45 superior officers: they were Obert, chef of 2nd Battalion of the 29th light; Girard, chef of the 1st cisalpine light half-brigade; F. Pagés, place officer, commanding the navy; captain Jovéroni, commander of the cisalpine sappers; captain Chapuis, commander of the pontoons troops; Mérique , artillery chef de bataillon; Krolikiewicz, commander of the 1st Polish battalion ;major Mosiecki, commander of the 2nd Polish battalion ; Wolinski, commander of the 3rd Polish battalion ; Baron, chef de bataillon of the 31st demi-brigade; Cappi, chef de bataillon at the 1st cisalpine light half-brigade; Marguel, chef de bataillon de la 99th demi-brigade; Lelmi, chef de bataillon at the 56th demi-brigade; Tourel, chef de bataillon at the 31st demi-brigade; P. Varennes, chef de brigade ; L. Fédon, chef de brigade of the 31st demi-brigade; Delisle, chef d'escadron of 7th dragoons; Lacroix, chef de bataillon at the 45th demi-brigade; Sicard, chef de bataillon, at the 45th demi-brigade; Malbrun, chef de bataillon, at the 45th demi-brigade; Jayet , chef de bataillon at the 2nd Légion Helvétique; Mesmer, chef de hataillon at the 1st Légion Helvétique; Ott, chef de bataillon, at the 1st Légion Helvétique; Bucher, chef de bataillon at the 1st Légion Helvétique; Armand Gros, chef d'escadron of the Piedmontese Carabiniers ; Abyberg, chef de bataillon at the 1st Légion Helvétique ; Eugène, chef of the 1st cisalpine light half-brigade; Dembowski, Chef of the 2nd Polish legion; Cerutti, chef de brigade of the cisalpine artillery; Kosinski, adjudant-général, commander at the 2nd Polish legion; Barthés, chef de brigade of the Legion Helvétique; Jonquière, chef tle bataillon of the Legion Helvétique; chef de brigade Girard; Borthon, artillery commander at Mantua; Wielhorski général de brigade; Balleydier, chef de brigade of the 29th light ; Meyer, général de brigade ; Périgord, chef de bataillon engineer ; Fontanieux, commander of the 2nd piedmontese line infantry ; Labadie, chef de bataillon at the 6th artillery rgt. ; Gastine , adjudant-général and Chief of general Staff ; Girardelet, chef de bataillon and chef of the 26th light infantry ; Monnet, général de brigade ; More1 , chef de brigade of the 56th line infantry ; Soulier, provisional commander of the place of Mantua; général Foissac-Latour, Council president and Leclerc, Council secretary. Foissac-Latour asked them to know if, with the actual strength, they could hope to defend themselves against the next Austrian assault.
As a result emerged that the infantry quantity able to serve, not including the killed or wounded since the first blockade, the sick, the soldiers employed at the hospital as personnel, the sailors, the officers, the sappers, the musicians, the drums, the miners, the workers, the gunners, etc., was three thousand six hundred and sixty one men, so distributed:
fifteen hundred men for the defence of the Migliaretto gate and Te; one thousand men for the place service and for the police, and nine hundred men as reserve. So there were no more than two hundred and sixty one soldiers carrying bayonets, to defend the passage at the Pradella breach.
Two members of council supported that the fortress could have been defended only for two or three days. The general, having put the pursuing-defence question at the votes, six persons declared themselves as affirmative: they were Monnet, Borthon, Labadie, Soulier, Pagés, Chapuis. All the others, among thirty eight, came out in favour of the denial. Voting for the second question, if they had to continue the defence of the fortress almost for two or three days, there were no more than four members for the affirmative: Borthon, Labadie, Pagès, Chapuis; and others, among forty, for the denial. In the meaning, Orlandini, was eagerly waiting for a definitive answer. The time became short and the answer, urgent; so Foissac-Latour, supported by the majority of opinions of the council members, suggested to propose, to general Kray, a base for an honourable surrender.
The chosen base was the capitulation Act, general Bonaparte had granted, in 1797, to marshal Wurmser, in an about similar condition. He asked that the garrison could be sent back by the shortest road and by marching towards the French army at Genoa. It was general Monnet the carrier of this project, however he came back from the Austrian headquarters at Castellucchio, with a negative answer. General Kray, less generous than Bonaparte, refused the French point of view. A new War Council was summoned in Mantua; all refused the project which requested the whole garrison, prisoner of war, to be conducted in the inner Austrian territory, waiting the exchanges to have someone released. So, the commander in chief had the idea to propose the prisony only for the Officers, leaving troopers free to reach their respective homelands. The Council adopted this proposition with unanimity, protesting that, if it was refused, rather they would prefer to bury themselves under the walls of Mantua, in front of a shameful act of an enemy abusing the superiority of its weapons.
On 11 thermidor (July 29), a hour after the daybreak, lieutenant-colonel Orlandini arrived at Mantua with the signed capitulation act, and 12 thermidor (July 30), the garrison went out by the citadel with the war honours and laid down arms on its glacis.
The Poles dramatic end
An additional article on the Capitulation act, wanted by Kray, stated that all Austrian deserters “will have their lives deserved and will be escorted to their respective regiments”. In effect the majority of the soldiers of the Polish Legion were born in Poland and, for the partition of Poland, in the period between 1772 and 1795, they were Austrian citizens; so they were also enrolled in the Austrian units, which recruited in Poland. When the garrison left the citadel, The Austrians ordered to stop the 2nd Polish legion column, which was in the middle of the French troops into the town. The Austrian soldiers entered the ranks catching the Poles with brutal manners, insulting the officers, and then escorted them into the houses nearby. The complaints of Wielhorski and his Staff were unuseful and Axamitowski, charged to escort the Polish till France, had only 50 men, who could follow him to Lyon. All the Polish officers were led to Leoben in Styria, waiting for an hard prisony, while, Foissac-Latour, accused by the Poles to be a traitor, was emprisoned in a different location (Klagenfurt, Carinthia) in order to avoid him face-to-face encounters with the Polish officers.
CAPITULATION DE MANTOUE
Au quartier-général à Mantoue, ce 10 thermidor an VII (28 juillet 1799).
Foissac – Latour, général de division, commandant les place et citadelle de Mantoue, propose à M. le baron DE KRAY, général d'artillerie, commandant les troupes de S. M. l'Empereur sous Mantoue, de lui rendre cette place sous les conditions suivantes, délibérees par le conseil de guerre de défense :
ART. I. La garnison de Mantoue sortira de la place le 12 thermidor ( 30 juillet ) par la citadelle de Mantoue, à midi, avec tous les honneurs de la guerre, six pièces de campagne en tête. Elle se rendra prisonnière de guerre. Pour lui éviter la honte et les miséres de la détention, le général qui la commande, les autres généraux sous ses ordres, les officiers de l'état-major, et tous les autres de la garnison, consentent à se rendre prisonniers en Allemagne, dans les pays héréditaires les plus voisins, où ils resteront en otage. Pour les sous-officiers et soldats qui seront renvoyés en France par la route la plus courte et ne pourront reprendre les armes contre les troupes de l'empereur et de ses alliés qu'après avoir été échangés. En conséquence, la garnison mettra bas les armes sur le glacis de la forteresse. Les officiers conserveront leurs épées, leurs équipages, et le nombre de chevaux qu'ils ont droit d'avoir, selon leurs grades respectifs. Les employées de l'armée seront également renvoyés en France. Les généraux pourront garder leurs secrétaires, et tous les officiera leurs domestiques. On accordera un drapeau au général Foissac-Latour, en considération de la vigoureuse défense qu'il a faite.
RÉPONSE-. Accordé dans toute son étendue, en y ajoutant, en considération de la manière franche, brave et loyale avec laquelle la garnison de Mantoue s'est conduite, qu'il sera libre au commandant, à son état-major et aux officiers de la garnison, après avoir demeuré trois mois dans les états héréditaires, de retourner dans leurs pays respectifs, sur leur parole d'honneur de ne pas porter les armes contre sa majesté impériale et royale, jusqu'à ce qu'ils aient été échangés. Les trois mois se compteront du jour de la capitulation signée.
ART. II. Les troupes cisalpines, suisses, polonaises et piémontaises seront considérées et traitées, sous tous les rapports, comme les troupes de la république francaise.
- Accordé.
ART. III. Il sera accordé au général commandant la place, trois fourgons couverts pour transporter ses équipages, papiers et autres objets à lui appartenant personnellement; ces fourgons ne seront pas visités, et il pourra en disposer à volonté.
- Accordé.
ART. IV. Le chef de l'état-major et les autres officiers supérieurs aurout la faculte d'emporter les papiers relatifs à leur administration, et pourront amener les fourgons destinés à cet usage et au transport de leurs effets particuliers. Les commissaires seront responsables de la remise des objets qui, par leur nature, appartiennent h la place.
- Accordé.
ART. V. On recommande à la loyauté et à la générosité du gouvernement autrichien la tranquillité des habitans qui ont été employés dans le gouvernement cisalpin, formellement reconnu par l'empereur dans le traité de Campo-Formio, ainsi que celle de tous ceux qui ont manifesté des opinions républicaines; les commissaires impériaux et les canonniers bourgeois ayant été traités de la même manière dans la capitulation conclue entre Bonaparte et le général Wurmser.
- Accordé.
ART. VI. Il sera nommé des officiers commissaires du génie et de l'artillerie, auxquels seront remis tous les objets appartenant à cette arme.
- Consenti.
ART. VII. Il sera nommé aussi des commissaires des guerres et des vivres pour remettre et recevoir les magasins qui se trouvent dans la place.
- Consenti.
ART. VIII. Les malades et blessés qui ne peuvent pas etre transportés continueront à recevoir les soins nécessaires à leur guérison. A cette fin, les chirurgiens franqais qui les traitent actuellement resteront près d'eux. Le général commandant nommera un officier qui sera commis à leur garde, et a mesure qu'ils seront en état d'dtre transportés, il leur sera fourni tous les moyens nécessaires pour rejoindre l'armée s'ils ont été échangés, ou de se rendre en France ou en Allemagne, sous les condilions accordées aux autres, sous le grade respectif.
- Consenti.
ART. IX. Il sera fourni par les Autrichiens une escorte convenable et suffisante pour garantir tous les individus compris dans la présente capitulation contre toute insulte et émeute populaire, et les commandans de l'escorte en seront personnellement responsables.
- Accordé.
ART. X. Tout ce qui, dans la présente capitulation, pourrait être douteux et faire naître des difficultés sera interprété en faveur de la garnison et selon les lois de l'équité.
- Consenti.
ART. XI. Aprés la signature de la capitulation, on se donnera réciproquement des otages qui seront, du cûté des Francais, un chef de brigade et un capitaine; du coté des Autrichiens, un colonel et un capitaine.
- Consenti.
ART. XII. En attendant la signature de la capitulation et l'échange des otages, il y aura une suspension d'armes de part et d'autre. - Consenti.
ART. XIII. Migliaretto sera occupé par un bataillon autrichien, qui détachera cinquante hommes pour occuper la partie extérieure de la porte de Cérèse. Les deux corps d'armée n'auront aucune communication, à la réserve des chefs et de ceux qui auront la permission des généraux respectifs.
- Consenti.
ART. XIV. Le commissaire du pouvoir exécutif et l'inspecteur-général de la police de la république cisalpine à Mantoue auront la faculté de sortir de la place pour aller où ils voudront.
- Consenti.
ART. XV. 11 sera accordé deux voitures pour les gens de la suite du général, et quelques autres qui auront reçu de lui l'ordre de suivre le sort de la garnison.
- Accordé.
ART. XVI. On accordera également les voitures nécessaires pour le transport des effets des officiers et des chefs de l'armée française faisant partie de la garnison, et même de ceux qui n'y étant plus pourront en avoir laissé dans cette place.
- Accordé.
ART. XVII. Les généraux et officiers qui voudraient envoyer en France une partie de leurs équipages, pourront leur faire suivre la marche des soldats, si toutefois le général Kray, qui se connaît en vraie gloire, ne pense pas que la sienne lui commande de faire suivre aux généraux et aux officiers eux-mêmes la destination de leur troupe, en les renvoyant en France sur parole d'honneur. - Réglé par l'article premier.
ART. Additionnelle
Les déserteurs autrichiens seront livrés à leurs régimens et bataillons respectifs.
Le commandant général de S. M. I. leur promet la vie sauve.
Au quartier général de Castellucchio, le 28 juillet 1799.
Le Baron DE KRAY, général d’artillerie
MAUBERT, chef de br.de, commandant en chef du Genie.
FOISSAC-LATOUR, général de division.
Le chef de brigade Borthon, commandant l'artillerie, n'a pan signé pour des motifs qui lui sont personnel.
Le général FOISSAC-LATOUR.
Aftermaths
One could easily imagine how resounding was and what bad impression the fall of Mantua had on French government and citizens. The act of capitulation contained an article, which can be so resumed: "General Latour-Foissac and his staff shall be conducted as prisoners to Austria; the garrison shall be allowed to return to France." These were circumstances which were calculated to excite suspicions of Foissac Latour. The consequence was Bernadotte ordered the inquiry into the general's conduct by a court-martial. Foissac-Latour was also charged with the blame to be supposed to have exchanged Mantua with some personal estates in Austria; but it wasn’t true. The Directoire and the Was minister Bernadotte continued their disciplinar inquest upon the facts, as witnesses reached the army gathering points in France and in Liguria.
This investingation was predestined to last for many years, since the main actors were prisoners in Austria. General Bonaparte, however, returned from Egypt surprised all with an authoritative position. He was awfully furious for the fall of Mantua, essentially for two reasons: [v]
1- what he had gained, in 1796, after 8 long months of siege, with great endeavours and some glory registered on the papers, disappeared suddenly in 1799, after a short period (around three months) of attrition without any large battle around Mantua. This could have demonstrated that Kray was a better commander than the future First Consul. Too hard to suffer, as for Napoleon!
2- the fortress had supplies and ammunitions which could have granted a one year period of utter defense, if the Kray’s attack would have been blocked at Pradella.
He erased the investigations of the court-martial, and issued a violent decree against Foissac Latour even before his culpability had been proved. This proceeding occasioned much discussion, and was very dissatisfactory to many general officers, who, by this arbitrary decision, found themselves in danger of losing the privilege of being tried by their natural judges whenever they happened to displease the First Consul.
After the Marengo battle (June 1800) Bonaparte wrote this letter to Carnot (July 24, 1800):
“Foissac-Latour trouvera dans le mépris public la plus grande punition que l’on puisse infliger a un Français … “ (or the public discredit as the worst punishment for a French man” [vi]
Foissac was expelled from the Army (directly by Bonaparte) and called “unworthy to wear the French uniform”. The final decret of expulsion was published on 24.08.1800. Napoleon himself decided to apply, for the first time, this Consular Act against him, cancelling Foissac from the ranks of the officers and inhibiting him to wear the French uniform. The future Emperor so commented his decision: “It was an illegal Act, tyrannical without doubts, but it was a necessary awful thing to do. He was 100, 1000 times guilty, and we were forced to censure him.We shot him with the arms of dishonour but, I repeat, that tyrannical act was due, like all exceptional decisions that are to be taken in a great Nation and under special circumstances.”
Foissac-Latour was never rehabilitated. The disfavoured general had no sooner returned to France than he published a justificatory memorial, in which he showed the impossibility of his having made a longer defence when he was in want of many objects of the first necessity. Some words of Jomini can better explain the reason of the Mantua commander behaviour: “… c’est la pusillanimité du général accoutuméà n’obeir qu’aux règles apprises au corps des ingénieurs …” (we can imagine what Jomini wanted to say and we can agree with him, also if, these words, written in such way, seem an attempt to oversimplify the matter, talking about a supposed general cowardice of the engineers officers, which cannot be accepted.)
Austrian Siege (Belagerung) Korps Mantua August 4, 1799 - after capitulation
Transferred to the Main Army in Piedmont
FML Paul Kray de Krajowa et Topolya
K.k. IR 40 Rifle Rgt. FZM Graf Joseph Mittrowsky | 1548 |
(I-II-III btns) Cmdr. Oberst Franz Kreyssern | |
K.k. IR 39 hungarian Rifle Rgt. Graf Thomas (Támas) Nádasdy | 3380 |
(I-II-III btns) – Cmdr. Freiherr Johann Nepomuk Apfaltrern | |
K.k. IR 16 Rifle Rgt. Freiherr Ludwig Terzy | 2700 |
(I-II-III btns) Cmdr. Graf Franz Khevenuller-Metsch | |
K.k. IR 4 Rifle Rgt. Hoch-und-Deutschmeister Erzherzog Maximilian von Köln | 2700 |
(I-II-III btns) Cmdr. Oberst Carl von Brixen | |
K.k. IR 45 Rifle Rgt Freiherr Franz von Lattermann | 1339 |
II - III btns. Cmdr. Obst Carl Rüdt von Collenberg - The I Btn was the Legnago garrison with 517 men | |
K.k. IR 10 Rifle Rgt. (former Kheul) | 1690 |
(I-II Btns) Cmdr. Oberst Freiherr Ferdinand Beulwitz | |
K.k. IR 48 Rifle Hungarian Rgt. | 1277 |
Former Rgt of Lombardy. later Rgt. Freiherr Philipp von Vukassovic – Cmdr. Oblt Franz De Baut (I-II Btns) | |
K.k. IR 13 Rifle Rgt. Freiherr Franz Wenzel Reisky von Dubnitz | 1512 |
I-II-III btns. 4th was at Palmanova in Friaul – Cmdr Obst Freiherr Carl von Brigido | |
I Btn. 3rd Grenzregiment of Carlstädt Ogulin Cdr. Freiherr Carl von Letzenyi | 819 |
III Btn 3rd Grenzregiment of Carlstädt Ogulin (former VII Carlstadt Btn.) | 950 |
IV Btn 4th Grenzregiment of Carlstädt - Szluin | 1044 |
Remained as Mantua garrison | |
Generalmajor Graf Johann Franz Seraphin von Saint Julien-Wallsee | |
K.k. IR 14 Rifle Rgt. Freiherr Wilhelm von Klebek | 1708 |
Btg I , II e III – Cdr. Oberst Freiherr Franz Kottulinsky | |
K.k. IR 43 Rifle Rgt. Graf Anton Thurn-Val Sassina | 1964 |
I-II btns . III Btn at Zara garrison (Dalmatia) - Cmdr. Freiherr Ignaz von Loen | |
III btn K.k. IR 32 Hungarian Rifle Rgt. Graf Samuel Gyulai | 686 |
II btn K.k. IR 18 Rifle Rgt. Graf Patrick Stuart | 758 |
II btn K.k. IR 10 Rifle Rgt. (former Kheul) | 840 |
K.k. 12th Cuirassiers Rgt. FML Moritz Graf Kavanagh | 872 |
(6 sqn.) Cmdr. Oberst Heinrich Bersina von Siegenthal |
Joined the Klenau Korps | |
Generalmajor Anton Freiherr von Elsnitz | |
Jäger Korps Freiherr Constantin d'Aspre (4 coys) | 408 |
K.k. IR 53 Croatian Rifle Rgt. GM Jovan (Johann) Jellacic Graf de Buzim | 1221 |
Btns I – II Cmdr. Oberst Johann Szenássy | |
K.k. IR 59 Rifle Rgt. FML Alexander von Jordis | 1775 |
Btns I – II - Cmdr. Obst Franz Högl von Hockheim | |
IV Btn Grenzregiment of Banat Wallachisch Illyrische | 345 |
II Btn Banal Grenzregiment or I Btn - 10th Banal Rgt. of Glina | 905 |
cmdr. Oberst Daniel (Danilo) von Oreskovic |
Central Italy Expeditionary Korps | |
Generalmajor Johann Graf von Klenau und Freiherr von Janowitz | |
Jäger Korps Freiherr Constantin d'Aspre (6 coys) | 615 |
K.k. 3rd Light Inf. Btn Oberleutnant Carl Freiherr von Am Ende (italian-Venetian Btn) | 635 |
K.k. 4th Light Inf. Btn Major Johann Nepomuk Freiherr von Bach (italian-Venetian Btn) | 526 |
K.k. 15th Light Infantry Btn Oberst Bonaventura Mihanovic (Croatian-Slavonian Btn) | 438 |
VII Combined Btn Grenzregiment Warasdiner of Varazdin | 295 |
VI Btn Grenzregiment of Banat Wallachisch Illyrische | 445 |
Bussy Freiwillige Jägers zu Pferd (Chasseurs a Cheval) | 768 |
Cmdr. Generalmajor Anton Graf Mignot de Bussy - (8 sqns.) | |
K.k. 8th Hussar Regiment (later Nauendorff) | 1038 |
(former Rgt Wurmser) (8 sqn.) - Cmdr: Oberst (Colonel) Emanuel Freiherr von Schustekh |
NOTES:
[1] Général Philippe-François Foissac de la Tour (Foissac-Latour) Born on July 11, 1750, dead near Poissy on February 11, 1804 (1806 ?). Entered the service in the Royal Engineers Corps (pupil at the Military Engineers School in Charleville-Mezieres) and, as Captain served in America during the War of Independance. There he got the revolutionary ides which led him back to France. He was then in the Northern army, at Namur (siege), Jemappes and, in 1793, he was named Général-de-brigade. Then he was suddenly dismissed from the army but in two occurrences he was committed as engineer chef-de-battalion. Suspected of anti-republican actions he was arrested and escaped the “guillotine” after the fall of Robespierre. In 1795 (24 may) was confirmed général de brigade ans soon was also named général de division (13 june) by the Directory. He remained at Paris, as expert fortress-commander, refusing to become ambassador in Sweden. In 1797 reached the armée d’Italie where he served for two years until he had the charge of Mantua’s Governor (1799). With the fortress capitulation he was prisoner at Klagenfurt (Carinthia), where he began a long and vain battle to rescue his honour, weakened for the Mantua’s surrender affair. While he marched to Vienna and his troops returned in France (and because of the suspect he had exchanged the Fate of the Polish soldiers (considered deserters by Austrians) with better surrender conditions for himself, the War Minister in Paris, Bernadotte, opened an investigation at Paris judging his operate. But the trial never took place. Bonaparte, who always deserved the uttermost ugly words against him, not forgot his behaviour. Returned from Egypt, said he was guilty for the loss of Mantua. Foissac was expelled from the Army and called “unworthy to wear the French uniform”. The final decret of expulsion was published on 24.08.1800.
Napoleon himself decided to apply, for the first time, this Consular Act against him, cancelling Foissac from the ranks of the officers and inhibiting him to wear the French uniform. The future Emperor so commented his decision: “It was an illegal Act, tyrannical without doubts, but it was a necessary awful thing to do. He was 100, 1000 times guilty, and we were forced to censure him.We shot him with the arms of dishonour but, I repeat, that tyrannical act was due, like all exceptional decisions that are to be taken in a great Nation and under special circumstances.” Foissac, forgotten by all former friends, retired in his house of Hacqueville near Poissy. After the publication of his defensive memoirs upon Mantua affair, he died there on 1804 (1806?).
[1] The term malaria (from the Italian mala “bad” and aria “air”) was used by the Italians to describe the cause of intermittent fevers associated with exposure to marsh air or miasma. The word was introduced to English by Horace Walpole, who wrote in 1740 about a “horrid thing called mal’aria, that comes to Rome every summer and kills one.” The term malaria, without the apostrophe, evolved into the name of the disease only in the 20th century. Up to that point the various intermittent fevers had been called jungle fever, marsh fever, paludal fever, or swamp fever.
[1] Adjudant-général Jean Baptiste Paul Gastine, born at Alençon (Orne) on August 24, 1755 from a humble family. On June 2, 1771 he voluntereed in the regiment of the Gardes Françaises. During the first years of the Revolution he was in the Garde Nationale de paris anf then in the 102nd infantry regiment as captain. In 1792 he was with the armée du Centre and with that of Moselle in 1793. On December 27, 1793 he was named adjudant général chef de bataillon and then was with the armies Rhin-et-Moselle and Rhin, where, on June 13, 1795 he wa promoted to the rank of adjudant général chef de brigade, with the order to reach the army of the Côtes de l’Océan in 1796. He was then on duty by the armies of Sambre-et-Meuse and finally in Italy, participating at the Magnano battle (April 1799). Having followed the troops withdrawing to Mantua, he remained there as Chief of Staff of the fortress commander. On July 1799 he was taken prisoner and sent to Leoben in Styria, where he had a long prisony, following the same destiny of all the French officers involved in the Mantua surrender. On August 3, 1801 he returned in France, sick and tired, and, after one month, he retired (or was forced to retirement). On December 5, 1805 he was recalled as Adjudant commander, under Lefebvre, remaining in the General Staff of the 5th Corps during the 1806 and 1807 campaigns. In 1808 he received the order to reach the army of the Pyrénées Orientales, but his health forced him to a new retirement. On November 2, 1808, sick, he died at Saint-Germain-en-Laye (Yvelines).
[1] Chef-dBrig. Marie Louis de Varennes (1736-1804). At the time he was 63 years old. In 1792 he was promoted Colonel of the 15e infantry regiment and on May 15, 1793 he had also a provisional rank of général-de-brigade. The 93e demi brigade de Ligne arrived in Italy on February 1797. It received the new flag models , de l’Armée d'Italie designed by Bonaparte, on July 1797 at Belluno, under division Delmas: the flag were, obviously, « virgins » or without any name of battles fought. It charged the flags with the title "traversée du Tirol". In 1799, the 3rd battalion of 93e was detached on garrison to Mantua with its chef de brigade Varennes (the other two btns. were leaded by the brave chef-de-bataillon Marion). Was at Mantua that the flag was taken by Austrians when the fortress capitulated on 30 July.
[1] Chef-dBrig. Ludvik Mateusz Dembowsky (1768-1812) Brigade commander in Legions, general and baron of French Empire. Was born 24.08.1768. in Dembowa Gura, Anjey's son. 1.12.1784 was sent to the army. Due to family contacts and resources of his father's treasure got the rank of cornet (khorunjim) in less than half an year, in 5 years he got the rank of captain and on 28.12.1791 he got the patent to the rank of major, commander of 6th infantry regiment. In the very next year he got the baptism of fire, fighting the Russians under the command of prince Josef (Ponyatovsky). In the rebellion Koszyushko, 1794, got the rank of colonel. After rebellion's defeat left the country and entered french army as volunteer 19.02.1795. As captain-adjunct he was ranked to the staff of Alps army of general Kellerman, then till the January 1796 to the Italian army (Rusca division). Had used the opportunity to serve under command of Bonaparte and was wounded near Saint-George.
Had got his trust, he left Paris 08.02.1797 with the bunch of dispatches to Venetian group of host. These dispatches holded information about supporting Polish Legions formation. He made up this mission successfully. In Milan, on his way he got an assigned from the general Dabrowsky to be the commander of battalion and temporary aide-de-camp. However, commander of Legions soon called Dembowsky 'unsuccessful acquisition', gipsyman, gambler, drunk-hard, scandalous man, who did know military service and removed him from the staff, had sent him to Mantua to command the 3rd battalion. Dembowsky, whose vanity was insulted, decided to change this negative appraisal. He set severe discipline among his riflemen. His project of creation of 'denarian fund' (national treasury) had attracted everyone's attention, and Dabrowsky, under the influence of flattery and impression of absolute faith, started to trust Dembowsky again. This was soon followed by honorary assignment of Legions representative at Military Minister - Biragge in Milan (30.08-21.09.1797). The threat of the war made Dembowsky return to the army. But in 1798 he was compromised once more. His letter, where he wrote about his readiness to support Dombrowky overthrow and his substitution for general Grabowsky, was intercepted. He also had to spend two weeks under arrest for his abuses at the border. Now all his followers left him (even Vibitsky).
Austrian compaign 1799 smothered personal dislike as Dembowsky fighted as lion. He was noted at Legnago, by generals Gardanne and Montrichard. 5.04. at Magnano he got wounded and was assigned as 2nd Legion commander instead of dying on the battle field Rimkevich. During Mantua siege he had shown much courage but also cruelty because of delicacy absence in relations with subordinates. These subordinates hated him that much that after capitulation during legioners internment in Garts two officers attacked him and hitted with sticks. Although Dembowsky fighted 15 duels, he refused to settle this quarrel in this way so he petitioned in austrian commendant's office. This caused revolt of his collegues. Even Dombrowsky, in spite of his favourite aide-de-camp's pains (Dembowsky's brother Jan), condemned Dembowsky. Fearing the officers would refuse to serve with him, Dembowsky tried to be proceeded to Dunay Legion. Although he was technically proceeded by consuls's decision and supported by commander in chief of Rein army - general Moro, staff chief Dessol, he could not overcome his compatriots' dislike asking the conflict to be solved according to honour code.
While parisian colony was in favour for conflict settlement, general Knyazhevich insisted that he would not accept an officer whose honour was stained. Dembowsky got sick with the grief as Gavronky death opened him an opportunity to be assigned as Knyazhevich's staff chief and he knew that his own compatriots would not allow that assignment. In despair, he found his offenders in Paris and made them bring their apologies. In the meanwhile new perspectives had opened. His brother, Jan due his widespread contacts (general Lannes, Murat, Dumas) managed to get to the First Consul (Bonaparte) and obtained Dembowsky's assignment (16.9.1800) as a brigade commander by the staff of Grizon army. Following the impulse, he left Legions and entered French Army. Since this time the wall of dislike had separated him from his compatriots.
His career seemed to be provided since besides his brother's protection he had found his faithful followers (general McDonald and general Baraguey d’Hilliers), who called Dembowsky 'successfull acquisition' and insisted on his being transmitted to permanent French position.
So due to odd fate's irony, on 12.3.1801 when he was officially excluded from Legions officer list, 105th french semibrigade insisted on his being assigned as its commander, underlying not only his knowledges and courage but also kindness.
[1] Antoni Kosiński called "Amilkar" (1769 - 1823). In his youth he was a novice of the Father Pio Order, that he left in 1790 to devote himself to the military career (from 1792 in 3rd Regiment of Lithuanian Infantry). During the Kościuszko Upraising he was promoted to the rank of Captain. Was wounded at the defense of Warsaw. After the fail of the insurgency he emigrated to France. So, in order to acquire the French citizenship, he served for next five years on the French Navy ships. In 1796 he was in the army of Italy, participating in the battles at Lodi and Arcole. In cooperation with general Dąbrowski he formed the Polish Legion in Italy. In 1798 he was promoted to the rank of colonel and 2nd-chief of II Legion. After the fall of Mantua was captured by Austrians. He was also the organizer of the Legion of the Ionic Islands Republic. Then, as the Legions were sent to Santo Domingo by the help of Adam Czartoryski, he offered his service to tsar Alexander the Ist. In 1803 he asked for being dismissed and in the rank of general of brigade he returned tin Poland. He devoted himself to the economy and literature. In 1806 he returned to the service by the side of general Dąbrowski. In two times he covered the duties of Polish Division commander: during the siege of Danzig and in the Friedland battle. For the 1807 campaign he was awarded with the Knight cross of Virtuti Militari. During the campaign of 1809 he was the governor of Warsaw and then chief of the polish troops. He fought with them in battles at Szczekociny and Żarnowiec. In 1811 he was promoted general of division and became the chief of the veterans Corps. During the war of 1812 he led the departments of Siedlce and that of Lublin, organizing the defense at the Bug river line. After the end of the campaign and the fall of the Warsaw Duchy, he asked for being dismissed. Died in 1823 in Targowa Górka.
[1] César Balleydier (1762-1805), from Savoy, had a troubled officer career in the republican armies and in those of the young Empire. He was son of a Notary, a young rebel boy loving the easy life. Cesar enrolled himself in a Swiss regiment of Piedmont (1783-1787), then, on 1792, when Savoy was annected to France, he took the command of Annecy Volunteers. The following year, 1793, was chef de bataillon at the Toulon siege, being promoted there (1794) chef-de-brigade. The Directory gave him a demi-brigade formed with volunteers reckoned from the new republican territories, mostly violent and rude men, sometimes outlaws. He fought in Corsica and Italy. In september 1796 was wounded and taken prisoner.
Obtained the freedom by prisoners exchange and returned to service, with some burocratic difficulties, but he had the command of his “criminals”. On 1799 he was taken prisoner again at Mantua, sent in Styria and finally exchanged. When in France he followed the bad fortunes of general Foissac.Latour, badly hated by Bonaparte, and was forced to retire. Recalled in 1802 he took the arms as commander at the Elba island and, in 1803, had the command of a new regiment at Utrecht Camp in Holland. In 1804 he was awarded with the Legion d’Honneur (Chevalier). He was present, with his regiment, at Ulm capitulation in 1805 and then sent against russian Avant-guards. In november, during the approaching march, was killed at Leoben in Styria, few days before Austerlitz.
[1] On March 1796 the 18e légère was merged with the 6e Légère to form a new demi-brigade with the number 29 (29e demi-brigade legère). The two merged demi-brigades had only a force of 1200-1300 men. The command was assigned to César Balleydier ex commander of the 18e, a proven officer, brilliant and brave. At the merging moment the 29e formed with the 4e légère or demi-brigade Allobroge, the AvantGuard Brigade commanded by general Rusca, division Augereau. In september Balleydier was wounded and taken prisoner. The command was given “ad interim” to Claude Clement, who, when chef Balleydier re-took the leadership, was absolutely unwilling to leave his command. Otherwise Balleydier was able to command his demi-brigade on 1797.
[1] Chef-de-Brigade Louis-Gabriel Monnet de Lorbeau - Born: 1 January 1766. Chef-de-Brigade: 23 July 1796 31.Demi-brigade di fanteria di Linea – promoted General-de-Brigade: 5 april 1799 – participated at the Mantua defence - General-de-Division: 27 August 1803 - Commander of the Legion d'Honneur: 14 June 1804 - Died: 8 June 1819
[1] Général de brigade Jean Baptiste Maur Ange Montanus Joseph Rodolphe Meyer de Schauensee (1768-1802). Born in Switzerland. Général de brigade. 13.6.1795 général- de-brigade. 1797 At Rivoli. 1799. Italy’s campaign. Place commander at Modena, Ferrara, Bologna, and engaged in the defence of Mantua. 1802 – died at Santo Domingo having got the Yellow Fever.
[1] General Józef Wielhorski (1759-1817) - polish general, had part in the russo-polish War of 1792, and during the Koshuszko insurrection in 1794. From 1797 to 1802 was with the Polish Legion in Italy, commander of the I Legion. From 1809 in the Duchy of Warsaw Army, in 1811 helped the War Minister (Józef Poniatowski) and became Division General.
[1] One lieue (league) de Paris was 2000 toises = 3,898 km, so one toise was about 2 m (1,949 m).
[1] Counting Artillery, engineers and workers.
[1] General Major Johann Franz Seraph III Graf von Saint Julien. Born on Decembre the 2nd 1756, dead on January 16th 1836. Suffered three important wounds in campaigns. The first at Belgrade (July, 12 1788), the second at first Caldiero as Colonel (November, 12 1796) and the last in 1809 as Feldmarshall. He was a k.k. Kämmerer, Oberst Erbland – Falkenmeister and Owner of k.k. IR 61 regiment. On January 16th, 1797 married Grafin Lodovica Leopoldine Chorinsky but he had also a second wife in 1800. To be differentiated from the other Generalmajor St. Julien, Joseph, who remained early in Tirol, then following Bellegarde Group.
[1] Foissac-Latour gave these details in his book, written after the return from the prisony, and entitled : « Précis ou Journal historique et raisonné des opérations militaires et administratives qui ont eu lieu dans la place de Mantoue, depuis le 9 germinal jusqu'au 10 thermidor de l’an VII de la République française, sous le commandement de F. P. Foissac-Latour, général de division; écrit par lui méme. » Paris, chez Magimel, libraire, quai des Augustins, n. 73, an IX (1800), vol. in 4°, 32 introductory pages, 103 pages as 1st part and 500 as the 2nd.
[1] Colonel Dembowski, was actually (and practically) suspended from his command and apparently promoted (read attached to the General Staff of the fortress). This determined a more reliable satisfaction amidst the Polish officers. By May 17, the command of the 2nd Polish legion was taken by Amilkar Kosinsky, directly promoted by Foissac-Latour himself, having he firstly refused that charge.
[1] Generalmajor Nikolaus Joseph Pálffy von Erdöd. Born 3 december 1765, son of prince Karl Hyeronimus and Maria Theresia princess Liechtenstein. General in Italy, died on May 26th, 1800 during an assault in the Aosta valley at Romano.
[1] The source says “300 Klaftern”, an ancient Tyrolian unit for measuring the ground, 1 Klafter being 1,896614 meters. The Klafter could be divided into 6 Feet (Fuß or Schuh-shoes, each being 0,316102 m). The Pradella approach was large 4 Schuhen (1,25 m) and deep 3 Schuhen (95 cm).
[1] Memoirs of Bonaparte Napoleon, volume 4 by Louis Favelet de Bourrienne His private Secretary, Edited by R. W. Phipps, Colonel, Late Royal Artillery 1891.
[1] « Défense au général Foissac-Latourde porter l’uniforme français
Au citoyen Carnot, ministre de la Guerre - Paris, 5 thermidor an VIII (24 juillet 1800)
Les Consuls sont instruits, Citoyen Ministre, que le citoyen Foissac-Latour est de retour d’Autriche, et déshonore, en le portant, l’habit de soldat français. Faites-lui connaître qu’il a cessé d’être au service de la République le jour où il a lâchement rendu la place de Mantoue, et défendez-lui expressément de porter aucun habit uniforme. Sa conduite à Mantoue est plus encore du ressort de l’opinion que des tribunaux ; d’ailleurs, l’intention du Gouvernement est de ne plus entendre parler de ce siège honteux, qui sera longtemps une tache, pour nos armes.
Le citoyen Foissac-Latour trouvera dans le mépris public la plus grande punition que l’on puisse infliger à un Français.
Bonaparte
Correspondance militaire de Napoléon Ier - Extraite de la correspondance générale et publiée par ordre du ministère de la guerre - Tome deuxième - Paris - 1876